Missed Opportunities (Partial List)
By Uri Avnery, 27.5.06
"THE PALESTINIANS never miss an opportunity to miss an
opportunity!" - this phrase, coined by Abba Eban, has become a by-word. It
also illustrates a wise Talmudic saying: "He who finds fault in others
(really) finds his own faults."
No doubt, from the
beginning of the conflict, the Palestinians have missed opportunities. But
these are negligible compared to the opportunities missed by the State of
Israel in its 58 years of existence.
The list that follows is far from complete.
ON THE morrow of the war of 1948, in which Israel was
founded, we could have achieved peace.
During the war, all the
territory in which, according to the United Nations resolution of November
1947, the Arab Palestinian state should have been established, was occupied by
Israel, Jordan and Egypt. Israel conquered and annexed about half of it, and
the rest was divided between Jordan (which annexed the West Bank) and Egypt
(which occupied the Gaza Strip). More than half the Palestinians were driven
from their homes - partly by the war itself, partly by a deliberate Israeli
policy. The name Palestine disappeared from the map.
In the Swiss town of
Lausanne, a tripartite committee, representing the United States, France and
Turkey, was convened in order to mediate between the parties. The Palestinians
were not invited, since they were no longer recognized as a political entity.
But a delegation of three prominent Palestinians did appear, ostensibly to
speak for the refugees, but in reality to represent the Palestinian people.
They contacted the Israeli representative, Eliyahu Sassoon, and offered to open
direct negotiations for peace. On instructions from Jerusalem, Sassoon
declined.
David Ben-Gurion did not
want any negotiations that might have compelled him to take back at least some
of the refugees, and perhaps even to give back some of the territory just
occupied. Contrary to the UN resolution, he was determined to prevent at all
costs the establishment of a Palestinian state. He believed that the
Palestinian question had been closed, that the very name Palestine had
disappeared forever, that the Palestinian people had ceased to exist. Much
blood was shed because of this monumental mistake.
IN JULY 1952, the revolution of the Free Officers took place in
Egypt. One sole voice in Israel welcomed it publicly - the weekly news magazine
Haolam Hazeh, which I edited. Ben-Gurion did indeed voice a rhetorical appeal
to the formal leader of the revolution, the old general Muhammad Naguib, but
the moment it became clear that the real leader was Gamal Abd-al-Nasser,
Ben-Gurion declared war on him. The appearance of Abd-al-Nasser frightened
Ben-Gurion, because here was a new type of Arab: a young officer, energetic,
charismatic, striving to unite the Arab world.
From his ascent to power
until his death, 18 years later, the Egyptian leader sent out feelers again and
again to find out if a settlement with Israel was feasible. Ben-Gurion rejected
all these efforts and systematically prepared for the war of 1956, in which
Israel tried, in collusion with France and Great Britain, then two predatory
colonial powers, to overthrow Abd-al-Nasser. Thus he fixed for generations the
image of Israel as a foreign implant in the region, a bridgehead of the hostile
West.
Ben-Gurion was a sworn
enemy of the pan-Arab idea and did everything possible to block its realization
- an effort that was crowned with success by his heir, Levy Eshkol, in the war
of 1967. Like many decisions of Israeli governments, this one also contained a
logical contradiction. Almost all Palestinians lionized Abd-al-Nasser. They
were ready to let the Palestinian identity be absorbed into pan-Arabism. Only
after the defeat of Pan-Arabism, not least by Israel, did the specific Palestinian
identity return to center stage.
It is difficult to
estimate the seriousness of the dozens of Abd-al-Nasser's peace feelers
throughout the years. They were just never put to the test.
THE HISTORIC opportunity, the mother of all opportunities, came
with the 1967 Six-day War.
The Israeli army won an
incredible victory over four Arab armies. After the six days, Israel was in
possession of all the territory of historic Palestine, as well as the Sinai
Peninsula and the Golan Heights. The entire Arab world was humiliated and
powerless, and reacted with empty and bellicose phrases (the famous
"No's" of Khartoum). The Palestinian people was in a state of shock.
It was one of the rare historic moments when a whole people is able to change
its basic conceptions.
At that momentous time
we could have made peace with the Palestinian people and offered them life in a
free state of their own, within the pre-war borders, in peace with Israel.
While the war was still going on, I personally proposed this to the Prime
Minister, Levy Eshkol. He rejected the idea out of hand. The temptation to
acquire new territories and settle there was just too strong.
(I must explain here why
I mention myself in this article: I was an eye-witness to many of the events,
and to some of them I am now the sole remaining witness.)
I raised the idea again
and again in the Knesset, of which I was a member at the time. To reinforce my
arguments, I held a series of conversations with the local leaders of the
Palestinian community and ascertained that they were ready to establish a
Palestinian state, instead of returning to Jordanian rule. I have in my
possession a document signed by the Prime Minister's advisor for the occupied
territories, Moshe Sassoon (the son of the Sassoon from the Lausanne affair) in
which he confirmed my findings.
We missed the
opportunity to make peace with the conservative, moderate leadership of the
Palestinian community - and got the PLO instead.
IN OCTOBER 1973 the Yom Kippur (or Ramadan) War broke out. The
main blame for the war must rest with Prime Minister Golda Meir, who had
arrogantly and rudely rejected all the peace proposals made by the Egyptian
President, Anwar Sadat.
In spite of initial
Israeli setbacks, the war ended in an Israeli military victory. Yasser Arafat,
by now the uncontested leader of the Palestinian people, drew the conclusion
that it was impossible to vanquish Israel militarily. A sober and pragmatic
leader, Arafat decided that the Palestinian national aims must be attained
through a settlement with Israel.
He instructed his people
to establish secret contacts with Israelis who had connections to the center of
the Israeli establishment. I myself conveyed messages from him to the new Prime
Minister, Yitzhak Rabin. Like Eshkol before him, Rabin was prepared to listen
patiently, but he rejected the Palestinian feelers. "I won't take the
first step towards a Palestinian solution," he told me in 1976,
"Because the first step will inevitably lead to a Palestinian state, which
I do not want."
(Intermezzo: Rabin, like
all the Israeli leadership at that time, advocated the "Jordanian
Option", which meant giving back a part of the occupied territories to
King Hussein and annexing the rest to Israel. Once, Foreign Minister Yig'al
Allon informed Rabin that Henry Kissinger proposed turning Jericho over to
Hussein immediately, in order to give him a foothold on the West Bank and
perhaps enable him to prevent the PLO from becoming the dominant factor.
Remembering that Golda Meir had promised to hold elections before giving back
any territory, Rabin answered Allon: "I am not prepared to go to elections
because of Jericho".)
Already in 1974, Arafat
induced the Palestinian National Council (the PLO parliament in exile) to pass
a resolution that opened the way to the Two-State Solution. It took him 14 more
years to get the Council to adopt a resolution that officially set up the State
of Palestine in a part of the country - thereby recognizing Israel's rule over
78% of historic Palestine. That was a revolutionary decision with far-reaching
consequences. Israel did not hear and did not see. It just ignored it.
IN NOVEMBER 1977,Anwar Sadat did something unprecedented in history: in spite of the state of war
existing between Israel and Egypt, he came to Jerusalem, the center of the
enemy camp. He offered peace: not just peace between two states, but between
Israel and the entire Arab world, with Palestine at the center.
When the negotiations
started at Cairo's Mina House, at the foot of the Pyramids, the Egyptians
hoisted the Palestinian flag, together with the flags of the other Arab nations
invited. The Israeli delegation raised hell, and the Egyptians were compelled
to pull the flags down.
At the 1978 Camp David
conference, where the peace terms were worked out, Sadat fought valiantly for a
settlement of the Palestinian issue. The foundations for an Israeli-Palestinian
peace could have been laid there. But Menachem Begin refused adamantly. In the
end, a meaningless document was adopted. In it, Begin did recognize "the
just requirements of the Palestinian people", but immediately added a
letter asserting he meant "the Arabs of the Land of Israel".
Arafat was present at
the session of the Egyptian parliament, when Sadat announced his planned visit
to Jerusalem. He applauded. He also proposed sending a Palestinian delegation
to Mina House. Among his colleagues, a revolt broke out. It was the only time
during his long career when his position was seriously threatened. But the
situation would probably have been different, if Sadat had obtained Begin's
agreement to the establishment of a Palestinian state in the occupied
territories, as he requested. It is possible that this failure cost Sadat his
life.
IN SEPTEMBER 1993, a year after the return of Rabin to power, a
historic breakthrough was achieved. The State of Israel and the PLO, on behalf
of the Palestinian people, at long last recognized each other and signed the
Declaration of Principles of Oslo. This envisaged that within five years, the
Final Status would be realized.
At the last moment,
Rabin's emissaries, mostly military men, made many changes in the text
previously agreed upon. The Israeli obligations became much more vague. Arafat
did not care. He believed Rabin and was convinced that the agreement would
necessarily lead to the establishment of the Palestinian state.
But almost from the
first moment, Israel began violating the agreement. Specific dates for
implementation were laid down - but Rabin smashed the agreed time-table,
declaring that "there are no sacred dates". The passage between the
West Bank and the Gaza Strip, an essential item in the agreement, was not
opened (to this very day). The third and most important
"redeployment" (withdrawal) of the Israeli army was not carried out
at all. The negotiations for the Final Status, that were meant to be concluded
by 1999, did not even start in earnest.
In 2000, Prime Minister
Ehud Barak compelled Arafat to come to a conference at Camp David, without any
preparations or prior understandings. That was the last opportunity to reach
agreement with Arafat, then at the height of his authority.
Instead, Barak treated
Arafat with open contempt and submitted what amounted to an ultimatum - a list
of terms that may have seemed "generous" from the Israeli point of
view, but fell far short of the minimum needed by Arafat. Returning home, Barak
declared that Arafat wanted to "throw us into the sea". This way,
Barak paved the way for Ariel Sharon's ascent to power and to the siege on
Arafat, which ended in his murder.
Arafat was a tough
national leader who disdained no means to achieve freedom for his people -
diplomacy, violence, even doubletalk. But he had a huge personal authority, and
he was able and willing not only to sign a peace agreement, but also to convince
his people to accept it.
Those who did not want
the strong and charismatic Arafat got Mahmoud Abbas, who finds it much more
difficult to assert his authority.
IN NOVEMBER 2004, Arafat died. In free elections, a large majority
chose Mahmoud Abbas as his successor. "Abu Mazen", as he is generally
known, has been for a long time identified with the idea of peace with Israel,
more than any other senior Palestinian leader.
The Israeli government,
which had demonized Arafat for many years, could have embraced his successor.
It was another opportunity to achieve a reasonable compromise. True, Abbas does
not have the authority of Arafat, but if he had achieved impressive political
gains, his position would have been much strenthened. But Prime Minister Ariel Sharon
boycotted him, ridiculed him publicly as a "plucked chicken", and
refused even to meet him.
Those who did not want
Abbas got Hamas.
IN JANUARY 2006, the Palestinian public elected Hamas in an
election that was a model of democracy.
There were several
reasons for this choice. A part of the PLO leadership had become corrupt. More
importantly: since the Oslo agreements, the living conditions of the
Palestinians under occupation had become incomparably worse. And, most
importantly: Since the Oslo agreements, the Palestinian people had not come a
single step closer to the establishment of the State of Palestine, while the
settlements were being enlarged and the occupation deepened incessantly. The
"separation" from Gaza, which was carried out without any dialog with
the Palestinians, served Israel as a pretext for imposing a blockade on the
Strip and turning life there into hell.
With the advent of Hamas
to power, the Israeli government retrieved from the attic all the old slogans
that had served in their time against the PLO: that it was a terrorist
organization, that it did not recognize Israel's right to exist, that its
charter called for Israel's destruction. But Hamas has scrupulously abstained
for more than a year from violent attacks. Coming to power, it could not
abnegate its ideology overnight, but more than once it has found ways to hint
that it would agree to negotiate with Israel and recognize it within the Green
Line borders.
A government interested
in peace would have grasped the opportunity and put Hamas to the test of
negotiations. Instead, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert decided to break off all
contact with them and to urge the United States and Europe to literally starve
the Palestinians into final submission.
Probably, the same rule
will apply again: those who do not want Hamas will get Islamic Jihad.
THROUGHOUT THE region, extreme Islamist elements are gaining
strength. One of the reasons is the festering wound of the Palestinian problem
in the heart of the Arab world.
For 58 years, our
governments have missed every opportunity to heal this wound. We could have
achieved peace between Israel and secular-national Palestinian leaders. If the
conflict, God forbid, turns into a clash between religions, there will be no
opportunity to miss opportunities - there just will not be any opportunities.
The number of the
opportunities rejected and the consistent way they were trampled upon by all
Israeli governments may lead to the conclusion that they did not want peace at
all. There has always been a tendency in Israel to prefer expansion and
settlement to compromise and peace. According to this outlook, there always is
"no one to talk with", there is "no solution", we shall
"forever live by the sword". "Unilateral" steps, whose real
aim is to annex more land, are consistent with this tendency.
If this tendency
achieves final victory in Israel, it will be a disaster for the state, which
has just become 58 years old.
But it should be
remembered that there are also tendencies in Israel that point in another
direction. Slowly but steadily, the illusion that there is or can be a military
solution to the conflict is evaporating. At the same time, support for a
Greater Israel and for the settlements is dwindling. The implosion of the Likud
and the growing support for "Convergence" are stages on the way to a
realistic approach.
If this process
continues, it will become clear that there is no lack of opportunities. All we
have to do is grasp them with our two hands.